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We match data on the daily newspaper coverage of a sample of Italian listed companies with Nielsen 
data on the monthly amount of advertising that a given company has purchased on a given newspaper. 
Controlling for newspaper and company fixed effects, we show that newspaper coverage of a given 
company is positively related with the amount of ads purchased on that newspaper by that company. 
We also find that coverage of a company is higher the day after a press release, but especially so on 
newspapers where more ads are purchased. This result on press releases is robust to controlling for 
ownership links between newspapers and companies, and –more generally- controlling for time 
invariant features of each company-newspaper pair, i.e. for (company × newspaper) fixed effects. 
Moreover, coverage is correlated with past day absolute return and trading volume, and this 
relationship appears to be steeper for those newspapers where more ads are purchased. 
Keywords 
Media Bias, Advertising, Press Releases, Stock Returns, Italian Press 





The media is the primary example of a two-sided market, whereas readers and viewers are offered 
valuable informative or entertainment content, while advertisers are sold the attention of the former. 
However, as highlighted in a recent game-theoretical model by Ellman and Germano (2009), 
advertisers could be interested not only in buying space on media outlets, but also in influencing what 
is featured in the so called “news hole”, i.e. the space where news and editorial content appear. This is 
the case, since the receptiveness of consumers to ads could be negatively influenced by media content 
that is at odds with the products themselves being advertised. By the same token, pieces of news that 
appear to be “objective” are likely to have a stronger persuasive effect on consumers than proper ads, 
so that there is a clear incentive to disguise ads as news stories. 
Ellman and Germano define this as the “regulatory view” on advertising. On the other hand, 
according to the “liberal view”, advertising revenue has a positive influence on the quality of 
information provided by the media, since it allows them to be less prone to the influence of the 
incumbent government (Besley and Prat 2006) and of political parties (Gentzkow et al. 2006). At the 
end of the day, the comparative relevance of the regulatory and the liberal view of advertising must be 
assessed empirically. Yet, there is little evidence on this, with two important exceptions, which are 
both more consistent with the regulatory view of advertising. Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) examine the 
correlation between mutual fund recommendations and past advertising expenditure on three personal 
finance publications and on two national newspapers, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. 
They find that, controlling for fund characteristics and other confounding factors, there is a 
significantly positive correlation between ads and positive mentions on the three personal finance 
outlets, but not on the Times and the Journal. Moreover, a recent paper by Di Tella and Franceschelli 
(2009) shows that there is a negative and sizeable correlation between the amount of ads purchased by 
the Argentinean government on national daily newspapers and the amount of front page coverage that 
those newspapers devote to corruption scandals involving members of the incumbent government. 
In this paper we provide new evidence on the link between advertising and media content, with a 
specific focus on the coverage of firms. More specifically, we investigate how a sample of 13 Italian 
companies listed on the stock market is covered on a daily basis by 6 different newspapers during the 
period 2006-2007, as a function of the monthly amount of ads being purchased by each company on 
each newspaper. We gather data on daily media coverage by performing automatic keyword-based 
searches of online news archives. Controlling for time-invariant characteristics of companies and 
newspapers, we find that newspaper coverage of a given company is positively and significantly 
related with the amount of ads purchased on that newspaper by that company. 
As we will more thoroughly discuss in the next section, through their public relations (PR) 
departments companies themselves are a primary source of information for the media and the public 
about anything newsworthy happening to them: information flows from the company to the media and 
the public take the shape of routinely issued press releases. For our sample of companies we perform 
automatic searches of their own archives in order to obtain the exact dates when press releases are 
issued. Again controlling for newspaper and company fixed effects, we find evidence that coverage of 
a given company is much larger the day after a press release. But it is also the case that this increase in 
coverage is systematically larger on newspapers where that company has purchased more ads the 
month before. This latter finding is statistically stronger when adding controls for the coverage of a 
firm by a newspaper that is (at least partially) controlled by that company. It is also robust to a more 
demanding empirical specification, whereas we control for time-invariant characteristics of each 
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company-newspaper pair, i.e. we exploit the time variation in media coverage, advertising expenditure 
and press release issuance. 
In principle, companies enjoy sizeable degrees of freedom when choosing whether to issue a press 
release, and what to include into it. In fact, financial regulations typically oblige listed companies to 
disclose price-sensitive information in a timely fashion through a press release. But this does not imply 
that all newsworthy information about a given company is included in its press releases. 
In order to proxy for the “residual” flow of real world events about a company that is not 
necessarily captured by its press releases, we expand our analysis of newspaper coverage by 
controlling for the absolute daily return of that company on the stock market. It is also the case that a 
large movement in the price of a given stock is newsworthy by itself, irrespective of the presence of 
other newsworthy events causing it. 
In fact, we find that the coverage of a given company is positively and significantly correlated with 
past day absolute return. There is also some evidence that this relationship is systematically steeper the 
larger the amount of ads being purchased by that company on that newspaper. However, when 
distinguishing between positive and negative returns, only the interaction of ads expenditure with 
positive  returns is mildly significant. This latter result is quite robust to the more demanding 
specification described above, namely controlling for (company × newspaper) fixed effects. In other 
terms, newspapers appear to be reacting more strongly to (positive) company-specific newsworthy 
events, the larger the purchases of ads by that company.  
Our results are also related to some recent literature on the links between media coverage and the 
behavior of financial markets. For example Barber and Odean (2008) show that individual investors 
appear to be net buyers of stocks being featured in the news, irrespective of the positive or negative 
tone of the news itself. If this is the case, our results point to an interesting synergy between the 
marketing and the investor relation department within listed companies: according to our findings, 
when a company buys ads on a newspaper, it also buys some additional attention of the newspaper to 
newsworthy events, which can induce readers as investors to be more willing to buy shares of that 
company. This in turn could translate in higher stock prices in equilibrium, i.e. a lower cost of capital 
for the firm (Fang and Peress 2008).
1 
On top of the contributions on advertising & media coverage and on media & finance, our paper is 
also related to the comparatively larger literature on political media bias (Groseclose and Milyo 2005, 
Gentzkow and Shapiro 2009, Puglisi 2006, Larcinese et al. 2007, Puglisi and Snyder 2008, Ho and 
Quinn 2008, Knight and Chiang 2008, Durante and Knight 2009). 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we provide some background on the activities 
performed by firms’ PR departments and on the interactions of those with media organizations. In 
section 3 we describe the dataset, while in section 4 we present our main results, and in section 5 we 
perform some robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. The internal organization of newspapers 
The fact that a company and/or its products are covered by the media creates informative externalities. 
Those externalities (of a positive or a negative sign) can arise both in the product and in the financial 
market. If this is the case, the company in question can find it optimal to engage in public relation 
activities, in order to enhance or to influence editorial coverage. 
To investigate this information dissemination activity, and its interactions with advertising and 
news selection, we have carried out 20 personal interviews with the different stakeholders involved 
(PR agencies, PR executives, newspaper editors in chief, publishers, newspaper sales executives).  
Companies value editorial space because (i) it is cheaper than advertising space and (ii) the news 
selection process carried out by the editorial team can attribute to a piece of news a degree of 
relevance and credibility that are difficult to obtain only through the means of advertising. 
Even if they usually claim a more elaborate communication support, PR agencies routinely 
evaluate their output by collecting the articles they have obtained for a particular client, and 
multiplying the obtained position-weighted space by the appropriate price that one would pay for 
advertising that covers the same spaces and positions. This sum must be lower than the agency fee as a 
bottom line for efficiency. 
Since the publication of a press release is free –conditional on the fact that the newspaper staff 
selects it-, companies compete fiercely on the intermediate information “market” where they can 
obtain valuable editorial space. The journalists we have interviewed, both in newspaper and 
magazines, declare to receive on average between 20 and 40 press releases on a daily basis, from 
which they pick up 1-2 news/articles per day. Since the same press release is sent to several journalists 
working for the same outlet, a conservative estimate of the publication rate on newspapers is around 
one article for every ten press releases. In specialized magazines, which are typically more focused on 
a particular topic, and where the matching between company disclosure and editorial interest is easier, 
the publication rate is higher, usually around one news every 3 or 4 press releases. 
But this dissemination activity is important for media companies as well, since it reduces the costs 
to gather and verify the information to be published. In a typical newspaper, around 60% of published 
stories originate from some sort of public relation activity performed by firms and organizations. 
Moreover, following the enlargement of topics covered and the growth in the number of pages, this 
share has been steadily growing over the last twenty years (Gambaro 2007, Boyd Barret 1992). 
According to Upa, in 2007 Italian companies spent 2013 million euros on public relation activities, 
and the growth rate in the previous 6 years has been more than double than the one for advertising on 
newspaper and magazines. This amount represents about 0.15% of GDP and around 10% of the total 
communication expenditure. Obviously public relations include other activities than media or investor 
relation, which anyway represent around half of total expenditure. 
In Italy Public Relation officers, both internal and outsourced, are estimated in the range between 
20,000 and 50,000 and they confront, or try to influence, 10068 journalists that are employed in the 
Italian press (2007 figure). 
The newsgathering activity performed by a newspaper can be suitably described within a principal-
agent setting, whereas the newspaper acts as an agent that selects news on behalf of its (collective) 
principal, i.e. the readers. The principal cannot perfectly observe the actions of the agent nor the 
intermediate market, which is fed by news agencies and press releases. This is the market where the 
newspaper on a daily basis would pick up the pieces of news to be published. Marco Gambaro and Riccardo Puglisi 
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In a nutshell, the editor-in-chief selects the more relevant news and chooses the level of effort 
needed to study, check and write them down. When doing so, he would follow some sort of editorial 
line that is welcome to the readers. 
A certain amount of effort and costs would on average translate in a given amount of precision, 
appropriateness and completeness for each published piece of news. 
The maximum effort is given to the more relevant stories of the day, but on the margin there are 
several combinations of effort and relevance that can offer the same output to the reader. From this 
point of view, the editor can select the stories to be published on the basis of some type of portfolio 
considerations. 
When the piece of information is related with a company or its products, a story-specific 
investment in disclosure and dissemination (press release, photos, contacts) can lower the cost for the 
newspaper to produce that news and therefore modify the rank of final relevance. 
This is in some sense a grey zone, because it is unclear whether the PR activity performed by firms 
can be considered as a clear-cut instance of media capture (Besley and Prat 2006). Indeed, as 
discussed above newsworthiness and precision-enhancing effort must be jointly taken into account and 
they are both valuable to the reader, so that there is not an ex ante definite ranking of potential stories. 
On the other hand this is an equilibrium phenomenon, in that a company has no reason to engage in a 
costly activity if the news regarding it is published anyway.  
In this setting the focus of the pushing company is on the (potentially) free editorial space, which 
must be compared with costly adverting, and the informative value given to the published story by the 
selection process itself. 
There are circumstances where the company tries to soften or to erase a bad news. This can only 
occur in a dynamic setting, i.e. when the PR executive has a stable relationship with the journalist. 
Over time she gives the reporter exclusive news or valuable information; once she has credit, she can 
ask for some deviation from the editorial selection standard. The rational reporter must consider the 
actual value of the relationship over the future years and trade it off against the intensity of slant which 
is required on that particular occasion. Private incentives might play a relevant role here: for example, 
some valuable information can improve the reporter’s position and increase her salary. 
A third typical situation is when a company is involved in a rent seeking activity. In this case the 
publication of a story containing the appropriate information is only a part of a larger process that 
usually includes (i) the hiring of some academics that would draft a piece of research matching the 
company goals and (ii) inducing the right person (usually public officials or decision makers) to read 
and pay attention to the obtained article. The information and the piece of research must be of interest 
for a large chunk of the readers in order to get published, but the only readers that matter to the 
company are those that ultimately decide about the rent. 
While there are several qualitative and anecdotal papers on the relationship between public relation 
officials and journalists, and its effects on media output, only recently have more rigorous and 
quantitative studies emerged, mainly in the financial sector. 
Bushee and Miller (2007) study a sample of 184 midsized companies that hired Investor Relation 
firms, and find that they have significant increase in disclosure, press coverage and trading activity. 
In the three setting described above the company can leverage on its advertising expenses over that 
particular newspaper both with the carrot of spending more, and with the stick of spending less (or 
completely withdrawing the advertising). While PR practitioners generally claim not to engage in this 
practice, this is perceived as a problem by journalists. In fact, media organizations adopt several 
institutional arrangements to deal with this problem. What Do Ads Buy? Daily Coverage of Listed Companies on the Italian Press 
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Other things being equal, this leverage is more powerful when the advertising revenues per copy 
are larger, the advertising client are more concentrated both in number and by sectors, and when the 
publication is weaker. 
When there is an exchange between advertising and coverage a newspaper can lose copies but the 
increased advertising can more than compensate this loss (Di Tella Franceschelli 2009). 
From the company perspective, private incentives of top managers can play a significant role. Since 
the information ends up being mixed with entertainment and being personalized in stories and 
adventures, top managers receive an extra media exposure and can transform the company investment 
into private benefits such as salaries, stock options and future positions (Nguyen 2005). 
Following the seminal work of Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) some papers have studied the 
interaction between advertising and coverage. 
Gurun and Buttler find that on U.S. newspapers there is on average a more positive slant in articles 
about local companies (as identified by the distance between the newspaper’s and the company’s 
headquarters) than about non-local ones, and they present evidence that this slant is linked with local 
advertising expenditure. 
Adverting can influence the editorial line of a newspaper also in more indirect and general way. 
Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001) propose a model where in order to get larger advertising 
revenues the publisher induces the editors to moderate the political message they convey to their 
readers, so that more readers may buy the newspaper. In this process of convergence the variety of 
political opinions available to the reader gets reduced.  
The same line of reasoning is developed by Strömberg (2004): his political economy model 
delivers the result that media would find it optimal to give more coverage to topics that interest larger 
and richer social groups.  
By the same token, in the case of European public televisions advertising revenues push the 
programs toward a growing commercial orientation (Gambaro 2005).  
The interaction between advertising and editorial coverage depends both on the structure of the 
advertising market and on the internal organization of newspapers and advertisers. 
There are differences between magazines and daily newspapers. In the former there are typically 
close links between the advertising department and the newsroom, up to the point that sometimes –and 
of course unofficially- sales department distribute on a weekly or a monthly basis the list of advertisers 
that should be covered by journalists. On the other hand, those links are typically milder in 
newspapers, where heavy advertisers rarely happen to be essential sources of newsworthy stories like 
in specialized magazines. In our interviews, both advertising executives and journalists assert that 
direct requests of quid pro quo are relatively rare in newspapers, while they are common in magazines. 
In 2007 Italian newspapers collected 1702 million euros of advertising, which represents around 
half of total revenues. This figure is in line with other European countries, while in the U.S. 
advertising share is generally 80-85% of the total. 
Geographic composition is also different. In Italy only 45% of the advertising is local, while in 
several north European countries the share is around 60%. The U.S. are on the opposite side of the 
spectrum, since only 20-25% of the advertising is national. 
Our paper contributes to analyze the impact of advertising and public relation on media coverage, 
with a focus on listed companies. Daily returns and trading volume can be considered as the revealed 
opinion of the market about the value of the news that the subsequent day can be published on the 
newspaper. The sign of the return give also a rough but measurable indication of whether the news 
environment on a given day about a given company is positive or negative. Marco Gambaro and Riccardo Puglisi 
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We deem newspapers as a suitable environment to test this relation. They are general oriented 
publication without a specific focus and -since on average they publish 200-250 articles every day- 
there is enough room for story selection and enough variation among different publications in editorial 
choices. Instead, in the case of TV and radio, the typical 25-minute long newscast includes 18-20 
news, and more than half of them are in some way imposed by the real world and by the agenda 
setting climate of the media environment. 
Moreover, within newspapers the relationship between the editorial and the sales department are 
weaker than within magazines, on the internet or in the professional press. From this point of view, 
any significant correlation between advertising and coverage would be particularly significant in a 
broader perspective. 
3. Data description 
To perform our empirical analysis, we combine four different types of data.  
First, in order to gather data on newspaper coverage, we have run automatic keyword-based 
searches of electronic archives for an initial sample of 6 newspapers (Corriere della Sera, Repubblica, 
Stampa, Resto del Carlino, Mattino di Padova and Tirreno) and 13 companies: Campari, Edison, 
ENEL, ENI, FIAT, Finmeccanica, Geox, Indesit, Luxottica, Mediolanum, Telecom Italia, Tiscali and 
Tod’s. For each (company × newspaper) match, we search -on a daily basis- for the total number of 
articles on that newspaper containing the name of the firm. Since newspapers vary in size both cross-
sectionally and in the time series, we proxy for this size by counting the daily number of articles 
containing the word “il” (the definite article in Italian for masculine nouns). In the empirical analysis 
we will focus on the daily relative frequency of articles mentioning a given company on a given 
newspaper, i.e. we will divide the number of articles mentioning that company by the total number of 
articles featured on that newspaper on that day. 
Second, Nielsen kindly provided us monthly data on amount of advertising purchased by each 
company that is listed on the Italian stock exchange on the main Italian newspapers. Since advertising 
expenditure refers to brands (and not to companies), we have grouped advertising data for different 
brands on the basis of the company owning them. The purpose of this reclassification is to match the 
advertising data with data on newspaper coverage, press releases and stock returns, which is at the 
company level. The data covers the period 2006-2007.  
Third, for our sample of companies we have searched in an automatic fashion their own archives, 
in order to obtain information on the exact days when press releases are issued. We thus construct a 
press release dummy which equals one the day after a press release about a given company has been 
issued, and zero otherwise. 
Fourth, we exploit the Yahoo! Finance website to collect data on stock quotes and transaction 
volume for those 13 listed companies. In particular, we use the stock quotes to compute the absolute 
daily return. 
Summary statistics of our variables are shown in Table 1. On average the companies in our sample 
are mentioned on one-third of a percentage point of the total of daily articles. The distribution of this 
variable is strongly skewed to the left, as shown by the fact that the median number of mentions is 
zero percent. The distribution of monthly advertising expenditure (expressed in thousands of euros) is 
similarly skewed, with an average amount of about 25,000 euros and a median amount of zero. At the 
company level, trading volume is again positively (and strongly) skewed, with an average of around 
20 million of euros and a median of 2 million. This is not the case for absolute daily return, which is 
only slightly skewed. 
In order to gauge some sense of the heterogeneity in the data, Table 2 reports descriptive statistics 
at the company level. The companies issuing the largest number of press releases during the time What Do Ads Buy? Daily Coverage of Listed Companies on the Italian Press 
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period are ENI and Telecom, with about 200 each. On the other side of the spectrum, the most 
parsimonious issuers of press releases are Campari and Mediolanum, with an order of magnitude less 
(i.e. around 20). Regarding articles mentioning each company, FIAT and ENEL enjoy the lion’s share, 
with about 19,000 and 16,000 articles respectively. On the other hand, Geox is overall featured on 
about 300 articles, while Campari appears on around 500 articles. FIAT and ENEL are characterised 
by the highest ratio between articles featuring them and number of press releases issued by them, 
while Geox and Finmeccanica have the lowest ratio. 
For each company we also report the mean relative frequency of articles mentioning that company 
over the total number of articles being published by each newspaper (column 5). We can also compute 
this relative frequency conditionally on the presence or the lack of a press release being issued by that 
company the day before (columns 6 and 7). We can then calculate the percentage change in the 
relative frequency of articles in press-release vs. non-press-release days (column 8). In a nutshell, the 
average relative frequency of articles about a company in the lack of a press release is informative 
about the newsworthiness of that company when the company itself does not produce any additional 
news. On the other hand, the percentage change in the relative frequency of articles in the presence of 
a press release would be indicative of the capacity of each company to create additional media 
coverage.  
With a cursory look at the table one can see that the largest companies in our sample, i.e. Fiat, Enel, 
Eni and Telecom Italia, do obtain the largest amount of newspaper coverage in the lack of an 
immediately preceding press release. On the other hand, smaller companies like Campari, Geox and 
Mediolanum, which start with a low level of coverage in the lack of a press release, enjoy the largest 
increase in newspaper coverage after the issuance of a press release. Quantitatively speaking, the 
average change is more than threefold for Campari, and more than twofold for Geox and Mediolanum.  
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics at the newspaper level. Overall there are about 57,000 articles 
mentioning our sampled companies. In relative terms, Stampa is the outlet dedicating more room to 
companies, while Resto del Carlino and Tirreno dedicate the least. Similarly to what done in Table 2, 
for each newspaper we compute the relative frequency of articles mentioning one of our sampled 
companies, respectively in the presence and in the lack of a press release being issued the previous 
day. We can also calculate the percentage change in coverage when moving from a non-press-release 
to a press-release day. From this point of view, it turns out that Corriere della Sera and Stampa are the 
outlets with the largest average increase in coverage after a press release.  
4. Results  
As mentioned in the introduction, we are especially interested in the relationship between media 
coverage of companies and advertising expenditure, controlling for potentially confounding factors. 
To get a first glance at the correlations in the data, we first compute monthly (instead of daily) relative 
frequencies of stories about a given company on each newspaper: We are thus left with 1872 
observations at the (company × newspaper × month) level. Second, we regress those relative 
frequencies against a set of fixed effects for each company and each newspaper, plus dummies for 
those cases where the company owns a significant stake in the newspaper itself. This is true for the 
match between FIAT and Stampa, and for the one between Corriere and FIAT, Telecom Italia and 
Tod’s. Finally, we compute the residuals of the estimated regression. We do the same (i.e. regress it 
against a set of fixed effects and obtain residuals) for the total amount of ads being purchased by each 
company on each newspaper the month before. Figure 1 displays a scatter plot of the coverage 
residuals against the ads residuals, together with the corresponding linear fit. The relationship is 
positive and strongly significant.
2 Controlling for ownership links and time-invariant features of each 
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company and each newspaper, our data suggests that companies buying more ads on a given 
newspaper obtain significantly more coverage on that newspaper. 
In order to delve further into this correlation, we run a set of fixed effects regressions with the 
relative frequency of articles mentioning company c  on newspaper n on day t as the dependent 
variable. As mentioned in the introduction, we first focus on advertising expenditure and the issuance 
of press releases by each company. More formally, we run the following type of regression: 
 
nct t c t nc t c t nc c n nct d pr ADS d pr ADS y ε φ ζ γ β α + × ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + = − − − − 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , _ _             (1) 
 
where  nct y  is the relative frequency of articles mentioning company c appearing on newspaper n on 
day  t,  n α  and  c β  are respectively a newspaper and a company fixed-effect,  1 , − t nc ADS  is the 
monetary amount of ads being purchased by company c on newspaper n the month before,  1 , _ − t c d pr  
is a dummy which equals one if company c issued a press release on day t-1, and  nct ε  is the error term. 
In order to properly take into account the fact that the error term might be serially correlated within 
company-newspaper pairs (even after controlling for company and newspaper fixed effects) and hence 
overestimate the precision of our results, we correspondingly cluster the standard errors at the 
(company × newspaper) level.
3 
Our regression output is displayed in Table 3, whereas we proceed by expanding the set of 
explanatory variables. Thus in column [1] we simply control for purchased ads, we then add the press 
release dummy in column [2] and the interaction between this dummy and ads in column [3]. In 
column [4] we add the two ownership dummies for Corriere and Stampa we have mentioned above. 
Across all specifications advertising expenditure is positively and significantly correlated with 
media coverage. The effect is actually smaller in size when controlling for ownership links (column 
[4]). In terms of magnitudes, a coefficient of 0.002 in columns [1]-[3] implies that an additional 
expenditure of 50,000 euros per month by a given company (somewhat less than a standard deviation) 
is associated with one additional article every one thousand about that company. Since on average 
there are around 13,000 total articles per month, this correlation translates in an increase of about 13 
articles per month. 
The issuance of a press release is a very significant (and positive) predictor of newspaper coverage, 
across all specifications. When not controlling for the interaction between ads and press releases (i.e. 
in column [2]), an additional press release is associated with around one and a half additional article 
mentioning that company every one thousand.  
Column [3] shows that the interaction between press releases and advertising is positive and 
significant at the 5% confidence level. The effect is more strongly significant (and still positive) when 
controlling for the ownership dummies (column [4]). The magnitude of the conditional effect can be 
calculated as follows: at the mean level of monthly ads (about 25,000 euros per month) an additional 
press release is associated with 1.375 additional articles every one thousand (0.12 + 0.0007 x 25). On 
average, if a firm doubles the amount of advertising, the effect rises to 1.55 additional articles every 
one thousand. It would jump to around 2 additional articles every one thousand when considering a 
standard-deviation increase (i.e., around 66,000 euros per month). 
The discrepancy in the size and significance of those findings when controlling or not controlling 
for the ownership dummies is consistent with the fact that companies holding a stake in a given 
newspaper are not constrained by the issuance of press releases in affecting media coverage about 
themselves.  
                                                      
3 See  Bertrand  et al. (2004). What Do Ads Buy? Daily Coverage of Listed Companies on the Italian Press 
9 
In columns [5]-[9] we proxy “residual” real world events pertaining to a company (i.e. those not 
captured by the issuance of a press release) by controlling for  1 , − t c r , the absolute daily return of stock 
c on day  1 − t , by itself and interacted with advertising expenditure.
4 It must be noticed that sample 
size decreases, since we are only considering days that are immediately preceded by a trading day, i.e. 
we do not include Sundays and Mondays in the sample. 
We find that larger absolute returns are significantly correlated with wider media coverage: in 
column [5] a coefficient of about 3 implies that a one percentage point increase in the absolute daily 
return is associated with an increase of 0.03 percentage points in the amount of coverage.  
The coefficient on the interaction term between monthly ad expenditure and the absolute stock 
return would be informative about whether newspaper coverage of a given company differentially 
reacts to the same stock return as a function of the amount of ads purchased by that company on that 
newspaper. In column [6] we find that this coefficient is positive and significant at ordinary 
confidence level. To get a sense of the magnitude of the estimated effect, consider a one standard 
deviation increase in the amount of ad purchases: the reactivity of newspaper coverage to the absolute 
stock return would jump from 2.151 to 3.67, i.e. it would increase by more than 70 percent. However, 
the interaction term is not statistically significant in column [7], i.e. when controlling for the 
ownership dummies. One should also notice that the significance and magnitude of the ads variable, 
the press release dummy and the interaction term between the latter is practically unaltered when 
controlling for past absolute return.  
A relevant concern here is that the estimated reactivity of newspaper coverage to the absolute stock 
return -by itself and interacted with ads purchases- does disguise different correlations in the case of 
positive vs. negative returns. In columns [8] and [9] we address this issue by separately considering 
positive and negative returns, properly interacted with lagged ads purchases. In fact, both positive and 
negative returns are significantly correlated with coverage, and the same is true for the two interaction 
terms in column [8]. On the other hand, when adding the ownership dummies, only the interaction of 
ads with positive returns is mildly significant at the 10% confidence level. If anything, the estimated 
reactivity of coverage is larger for positive returns than for negative ones (as shown by the p-value on 
the corresponding t-test), but one cannot reject at ordinary confidence levels the null hypothesis that 
the differential reactivity of coverage to stock returns as a function of ads purchases is not significantly 
different for positive and negative returns.  
Up to now, in order to estimate our effects of interest, we have exploited the fact that -for each 
listed company in our sample and each trading day- we have media coverage data for six different 
dailies, which differ on the basis of the monetary amount of ads being purchased by that company. In 
other terms, we have checked whether coverage of a given company, conditionally on the issuance of 
a press release and the last available absolute return on the stock market, systematically depends on 
the amount of ads being purchased on the different newspapers. From this point of view, our 
identification strategy relies on both the time series and the cross-sectional variation across 
newspapers. 
One could also try and explore the time variation in the amount of ads being purchased by company 
c on newspaper n, and correlate it again with media coverage. More formally, we modify equation (1) 
by including fixed effects for each (company-newspaper) pair. This is of course a more demanding 
specification, since we are controlling for all time-invariant factors that are specific of a given 
(company-newspaper) pair, and we are solely exploiting the time series variation in newspaper 
coverage as a function of the time variation in monthly expenditure. Results of this exercise are shown 
                                                      
4  The last columns in Table 2 and 3 respectively report the estimated company and newspaper specific fixed effects, as 
estimated with the specification adopted in column [6] of Table 4. Those fixed effects provide a measure of the 
newsworthiness of each company and “news-proneness” of each newspaper after controlling for ads expenditure, press 
release issuance and stock market behavior. Marco Gambaro and Riccardo Puglisi 
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in Table 5, which replicates the format of Table 4, with the sole exception of not including the 
specifications with the ownership dummies, as (company × newspaper) fixed effects would absorb 
them.  
First, it is interesting to notice that in this setup the partial correlation with monthly ad expenditure 
is no longer statistically significant, with the sole exception of column [4], i.e. when controlling for 
lagged absolute return. On the other hand, it is still the case that newspaper coverage of a given 
company is significantly larger the day after a press release, and that this increase in coverage is 
systematically larger the more ads are purchased by that company on a given newspaper.  
Columns [4]-[5] show that past absolute return is positively and significantly associated with 
newspaper coverage. Similarly to what found in Table 4, the interaction between the absolute return 
and ads expenditure is positive and mildly significant when not controlling for the ownership dummies 
(column [4]), while it is not significant when doing so. In column [6] we again distinguish between 
positive and negative returns. Both positive and negative returns are significantly correlated with 
coverage, but only the interaction of ads expenditure with positive returns is estimated to be positive 
and mildly significant at the 10% confidence level, while the one with negative returns is positive but 
not statistically significant. However, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two interaction 
terms are equal. 
5. Robustness checks 
In Table 6 we present some robustness checks of our results. The table is organized as follows: in 
columns [1]-[4] we add past day trading volume and its interaction with ads expenditure as 
explanatory variables. As argued by Barber and Odean (2008), larger than usual trading volume for a 
given stock is likely to be associated with the arrival of relevant news pertaining to that company. In 
fact, investors might disagree on how to interpret those pieces of news, so that there is a larger amount 
of transactions on the stock (see Frazzini and Lamont 2007 for additional references). In columns [1]-
[2] we control for company and newspaper fixed effects, while in columns [3]-[4] we control for 
(company × newspaper) fixed effects: for both specifications, we first control for absolute returns and 
then distinguish between positive and negative returns.  
We find that trading volume is a positive and significant predictor of newspaper coverage; 
moreover, when controlling for time-invariant features of each company-newspaper pair, the 
interaction between trading volume and ads expenditure is positive and mildly significant. On the 
other hand, the interaction between returns and ads expenditure is no longer significant at ordinary 
confidence level. The other results are reasonably robust to this specification, with the only exception 
of the positive correlation between newspaper coverage and ads expenditure, which is no longer 
significant with this more demanding specification. Of course, one should take into account that here 
we are interacting ads expenditure with the press release dummy, stock returns and trading volume 
within the same specification, so that approximate multicollinearity might lower the estimated 
precision of individual coefficients. 
In columns [5]-[8] we replace last month’s ads expenditure with the contemporaneous value 
thereof, again interacted with the press release dummy and previous day absolute return. Endogeneity 
concerns clearly induce us to prefer the baseline specification -with previous month’s advertising 
expenditure as explanatory variable-, but one could argue that newspaper coverage more immediately 
reacts to contemporaneous expenditure. We replicate the set of specifications being used in columns 
[1]-[4], and we similarly find that advertising expenditure is no longer a significant predictor of 
newspaper coverage, even when not controlling for (company × newspaper) fixed effects. Compared 
to the baseline results shown in Table 4 and 5, the interaction between ads expenditure and the press 
release dummy is still positive and significant, but at a lower confidence level; on the other hand, the What Do Ads Buy? Daily Coverage of Listed Companies on the Italian Press 
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interactions between (absolute and positive) returns and ads expenditure do reach higher levels of 
statistical significance here. 
Finally, in columns [9]-[12] we control for the sum of ads expenditure during the last three months, 
again properly interacted with our variables of interest. The purpose of this exercise is to check 
whether the cumulative amount of ads being purchased by a given company on a given newspaper is a 
less noisy signal than previous month’s expenditure. The sign and statistical significance of ads 
expenditure, the press release dummy and their interaction is comparable to what found with the 
baseline specification. Interestingly, while the interaction of ads expenditure with neither positive nor 
negative returns is significantly different from zero at ordinary confidence levels, here one can reject 
the null hypothesis that those interactions are equal, i.e. the interaction with positive returns appears to 
be significantly larger than the one with negative returns. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated how –in a sample of Italian newspapers- coverage of listed 
companies is correlated with advertising. More specifically, we find that the amount of advertising a 
given company purchases on a given newspaper is positively and significantly associated with the 
number of articles mentioning that company. This result is robust to controlling for time-invariant 
features of newspapers and companies. 
We have also matched coverage and advertising data with data on the exact days when companies 
issue their press releases. Unsurprisingly, newspaper coverage of a given company is significantly 
larger the day after a press release. But it is also the case that this increase in coverage is significantly 
larger on newspapers where that company has purchased more ads. This result is statistically stronger 
when controlling for ownership links between companies and newspapers, and when generally 
controlling for (company × newspaper) fixed effects.  
We use the previous day absolute return of the company’s stock as a proxy for the presence of 
company-specific newsworthy events, which are not fully captured by the issuance of press releases, 
and find some evidence that positive returns obtain systematically more attention on those newspapers 
that receive more advertising from the company in question.  
From this point of view, strategic actions by firms -in the shape of ads purchases- appear to 
influence the amount of information regarding them that is provided by actors like newspapers, which 
in principle should not behave as agents for a principal other than their readers. 
In the future we plan to check whether this pattern of results is robust to extending our sample of 
companies and newspapers. From a broader perspective, one can replicate the analysis performed here 
in other country settings. Ex ante, in the case of daily newspapers, it would be interesting to check 
whether the correlations we have found are typical of countries where national level advertising is 
widespread, while they are less strong in countries like the U.S., where local advertising is 
comparatively more relevant. Marco Gambaro and Riccardo Puglisi 
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Table 1: summary statistics 
            
Variable  No of obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Newspaper x company level variables              
relative frequency of articles on newspaper n mentioning company c (%)  53704 0.306 0 0.644 0 18.54839 
monthly advertising expenditure, thousands of euros  1872 24.962 0 66.614 0 695 
            
Company level variables                   
daily absolute return  6440 0.012 0.0087 0.011 0 0.11 
daily trading volume, million of euros  6440 20.388 2.1392 47.926 0 980 
            
Notes: the relative frequency of articles on newspaper n about company c is calculated by dividing the daily count of articles mentioning company c on newspaper n by the daily number of articles where 
the word "il" (Italian definite article for masculine nouns) appears. This relative frequency is expressed in percentage points. 
Sources: article counts come from keyword-based searches of online news archives. Ad data is from Nielsen, while financial data is taken from the Yahoo! Finance website. 
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Table 2: company level data, 2006-2007 
                





articles/(press releases)  relative frequency 
of articles (%) 
rf of articles in days 
after a press release 
(%) 
rf of articles in days 
with no press release 
(%) 
change in relative 




campari 22 483  21.95455 0.0332602 0.1364054 0.0299354 355.6655 -1.078235 
edison 42 2062  49.09524 0.153081 0.2329925 0.148021 57.40505 -0.9563448 
enel 191 15799  82.71728 0.8345444 1.004815 0.7725204 30.06974 -0.3342947 
eni 137 5855  42.73722 0.4961684 0.6519045 0.4587076 42.11765 -0.6415821 
fiat 77 19142  248.5974 1.438025 1.705552 1.405972 21.30775 0 
finmeccanica 112 1687  15.0625 0.1379814 0.2359285 0.1196251 97.2233 -0.9669719 
geox 39 332  8.51282 0.0292919 0.0816129 0.0261929 211.5838 -1.091043 
indesit 54 961  17.7963 0.0478967 0.0991368 0.0436838 126.9421 -1.075854 
luxottica 49 818  16.69388 0.0755 0.1405838 0.0707135 98.80761 -1.032097 
mediolanum 23 1513  65.78261 0.1135935 0.3477527 0.106106 227.7408 -1.004995 
telecom italia  204 5350  26.22549 0.4171141 0.4895966 0.3883614 26.06728 -0.9490457 
tiscali 47 2208  46.97872 0.1506723 0.2834693 0.1412384 100.7027 -0.8322881 
tods 28 691  24.67857 0.0551606 0.137754 0.0517028 166.4345 -1.08209 
              
Notes: for each company we report the total number of press releases being issued during the time period (column 2), the total number of articles being published on our sample of newspapers (column 3), the ratio 
between articles and press releases (column 4), the mean relative frequency of articles over the total (column 5), the relative frequency of articles conditional on a press release being issued the day before (column 6), 
the relative frequency of articles in the lack of a press release the previous day (column 7), the percentage change in the relative frequency of articles in press-release vs. non-press-release days (column 8). Finally in 
column 9 we report the estimated company-specific fixed effect, as obtained from a regression with the relative frequency of articles mentioning company c on newspaper n, controlling for newspaper fixed effects, 
previous month's ads, a press-release dummy, the absolute return on the stock market the day before, and the interactions of those latter variables with monthly ads expenditure. See the text for additional details. 
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Table 3: newspaper level data, 2006-2007 
              
NEWSPAPER  number of articles 
on sampled 
companies 
total number of 
articles 
freq of articles 
on companies 
(%) 
freq of articles on 
companies the day after 
a press release (%) 
freq of articles on 
companies in the lack 
of a press release (%) 
change in relative 
frequency after a 
press release (%) 
newspaper 
fixed effect 
Corriere della Sera  7848  161137  4.87039 0.7676254  0.3159567  142.9527  1.100256 
Repubblica 12261  335335  3.656344  0.4553166 0.2611352 74.36046  1.037812 
Stampa 6627  91414  7.249437  1.11424 0.4948258 125.1783  1.29685 
Resto del Carlino  12726  502509  2.532492 0.3569597  0.1852831  92.65638  0.9895052 
Mattino di Padova  3770  127821  2.949437 0.3869579  0.2060711  87.77877  1.028056 
Tirreno 13669  540162  2.530537  0.3485993 0.1624168 114.6326  0.9925553 
              
Notes: for each newspaper we report the total number of articles mentioning our sample of companies (column 2), the total number of articles being published during the time period (column 3), the mean 
relative frequency of articles mentioning those companies over the total (column 4), the relative frequency of articles mentioning a company, conditional on a press release being issued the day before (column 
5), the relative frequency of articles in the lack of a press release the previous day (column 6), the percentage change in the relative frequency of articles in press-release vs. non-press-release days (column 7). 
Finally in column 8 we report the estimated newspaper-specific fixed effect, as obtained from a regression with the relative frequency of articles mentioning company c on newspaper n as dependent variable, 
controlling for company fixed effects, previous month's ads, a press-release dummy, the absolute return on the stock market the day before, and the interactions of those latter variables with monthly ads 
expenditure. See the text for additional details. 
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Table 4: daily coverage of listed companies, company and newspaper fixed effects 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
           
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.0005* 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001**  advertising expenditure, previous month 
[3.59] [3.58] [3.35] [1.85] [4.04] [2.84] [2.12] [2.84] [2.11] 
-  0.147*** 0.129*** 0.120***  -  0.107*** 0.099*** 0.107*** 0.099***  press release dummy 
  [6.48] [6.13] [6.11]    [5.99] [5.85] [5.97] [5.82] 
-  -  0.0005**  0.0007***  -  0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001***  advertising expenditure x press release dummy 
   [2.00]  [3.64]  [2.14]  [3.24]  [2.13]  [3.21] 
dummy for owner's coverage on Corriere  -  -  - 0.061 -  - 0.076 - 0.076 
       [0.76]    [0.86]  [0.86] 
dummy for owners' coverage on Stampa  -  -  - 1.360*** -  - 1.240*** - 1.241*** 
       [9.63]    [8.74]  [8.75] 
- - - -  3.113***  2.151***  2.417***  - -  absolute stock return, previous day 
     [6.43]  [4.86]  [5.17]    
- - - - -  0.023**  0.015  - -  advertising expenditure x absolute return 
      [2.49]  [1.47]    
- - - - - - -  2.359***  2.626***  positive absolute return, previous day 
        [4.75]  [5.11] 
- - - - - - -  0.023**  0.017*  advertising expenditure x positive absolute return 
        [2.48]  [1.67] 
- - - - - - -  1.896***  2.169***  negative absolute return, previous day 
        [4.46]  [4.70] 
- - - - - - -  0.022**  0.013  advertising expenditure x negative absolute return 
        [2.41]  [1.15] 
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- - - - - - -  0.12  0.13  test of equal slopes for positive and negative returns: p-value 
         
- - - - - - -  0.67  0.28  test of equal slope for interactions of ads with positive and 
negative returns: p-value 
                          
R  squared  0.45 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.45 0.48 
Number  of  companies  13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Number  of  newspapers  6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Observations  53704 53704 53704 53704 37911 37911 37911 37911 37911 
newspaper  fixed  effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
company  fixed  effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
newspaper  x  company  fixed  effects  no no no no no no no no no 
Notes:  the table displays the output of OLS regressions with the relative frequency of articles on newspaper n mentioning company c as dependent variable. Company-specific and 
newspaper-specific fixed effects are included in each specification. Monthly ad expenditure refers to the previous month. The dummy for owner's coverage on Stampa equals one for the 
coverage of FIAT on Stampa. The dummy for owners' coverage on Corriere equals one for coverage of Fiat, Telecom Italia and Tod's on Corriere. Standard errors are clustered at the 
(company x newspaper) level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in brackets below each coefficient. Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In columns [8] and 
[9] we separately consider positive and negative returns, properly interacted with the ad expenditure variable, and report the p-values of the tests for equal slopes and for equal interaction 
terms. 
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Table 5: daily coverage of listed companies, (company x newspaper) fixed effects 
   [1]  [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
         
0  0 0  0.0003*  0 0  advertising expenditure, previous month 
[1.15]  [1.03] [0.18] [1.74] [0.32] [0.34] 
- 0.150***  0.121***  -  0.099***  0.099***  press release dummy 
 [6.41]  [6.12]    [5.96]  [5.94] 
-  - 0.001*** - 0.001***  0.001***  advertising expenditure x press release dummy 
   [4.12]    [3.19]  [3.16] 
- -  -  3.176***  2.460***  -  absolute stock return, previous day 
     [6.57]  [5.39]   
- -  -  -  0.014  -  advertising expenditure x absolute return 
       [1.50]   
-  - - - -  2.677***  positive absolute return, previous day 
       [5.35] 
-  - - - -  0.016*  advertising expenditure x positive absolute return 
       [1.76] 
-  - - - -  2.204***  negative absolute return, previous day 
       [4.84] 
-  - - - -  0.012  advertising expenditure x negative absolute return 
       [1.10] 
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-  - - - -  0.12  test of equal slopes for positive and negative returns: p-value 
       
-  - - - -  0.27  test of equal slope for interactions of ads with positive and negative returns: p-
value 
                 
R squared  0.52  0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Number of companies  13  13  13  13  13  13 
Number  of  newspapers  6  6 6 6 6 6 
Observations  53704  53704 53704 37911 37911 37911 
newspaper  fixed  effects  yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
company fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
newspaper x company fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes: the table displays the output of OLS regressions with the relative frequency of articles on newspaper n mentioning company c as dependent variable. (Company x 
newspaper)-specific fixed effects are included in each specification. Monthly ad expenditure refers to the previous month. Standard errors are clustered at the (company x 
newspaper) level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in brackets below each coefficient. Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In column 
[6] we separately consider positive and negative returns, properly interacted with the ad expenditure variable, and report the p-values of the tests for equal slopes and for 
equal interaction terms. 
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Table 6: robustness checks 
  trading volume    current month's ads    three-month sum of ads 
    [1] [2] [3] [4]    [5] [6] [7] [8]    [9]  [10]  [11]  [12] 
                       
0 0 0 0    0 0 0 0    0.0003*  0.0003*  0  0  advertising expenditure 
[1.31]  [1.30]  [1.00]  [1.00]    [1.30]  [1.30]  [0.73]  [0.73]    [1.92] [1.90] [1.38] [1.44] 
0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099***    0.099*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.101***   0.089***  0.088***  0.089***  0.089***  press release dummy 
[5.93]  [5.91]  [5.95]  [5.93]    [5.29]  [5.26]  [5.54]  [5.51]    [4.97] [4.92] [5.16] [5.11] 
0.001***  0.001*** 0.0008* 0.0008*   0.001*  0.001*  0.001*  0.001*   0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***  advertising expenditure x press release dummy 
[2.97]  [2.87]  [1.88]  [1.86]    [1.91]  [1.88]  [1.83]  [1.80]    [4.31] [4.25] [4.49] [4.37] 
0.081  0.081 -  -    0.085  0.085 -  -    0.049 0.05  -  -  dummy for owner's coverage on Corriere 
[0.90]  [0.90]       [0.93]  [0.93]       [0.57]  [0.58]     
1.302***  1.302*** -  -    1.273***  1.272*** -  -    1.141***  1.142***  -  -  dummy for owners' coverage on Stampa 
[8.62]  [8.63]       [8.78]  [8.77]       [6.82]  [6.79]     
2.196*** - 2.228*** -    2.430*** - 2.448*** -    2.609***  -  2.699***  -  absolute stock return, previous day 
[4.76]  [5.03]     [5.26]  [5.50]     [4.97]    [5.36]   
0.007  -  0.005  -    0.019* - 0.017** -    0.003  -  0.003  -  advertising expenditure x absolute return 
[0.79]  [0.75]     [1.87]  [2.29]     [0.71]    [0.66]   
- 2.401*** - 2.442***    - 2.648*** - 2.676***   -  2.794***  -  2.873***  positive absolute return, previous day 
 [4.68]  [4.94]     [5.12]  [5.34]      [4.96]    [5.33] 
- 0.007 - 0.005    -  0.021**  -  0.019***    -  0.004  -  0.004  advertising expenditure x positive absolute return 
 [0.79]  [0.73]     [2.17]  [2.84]      [1.02]    [1.06] 
- 1.941*** - 1.962***    - 2.166*** - 2.169***   -  2.389***  -  2.496***  negative absolute return, previous day 
 [4.27]  [4.47]     [4.70]  [4.91]      [4.48]    [4.80] 
- 0.007 - 0.005    - 0.016 - 0.015    -  0.001  -  0.001  advertising expenditure x negative absolute return 
 [0.70]  [0.60]     [1.40]  [1.54]      [0.31]    [0.18] 
0.001**  0.001**  0.001***  0.001***    -  -  -  -    - - - -  trading volume, previous day 
[2.27]  [2.27]  [2.72]  [2.72]                  
0  0  0.000*  0.000*    -  -  -  -    - - - -  advertising expenditure x trading volume 
[1.49]  [1.49]  [1.88]  [1.86]                  
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- 0.15 - 0.14    - 0.17 - 0.14    -  0.21  -  0.25  test of equal slopes for positive and negative returns: 
p-value                       
- 0.99 - 0.98    - 0.32 - 0.47    -  0.04  -  0.02  test of equal slope for interactions of ads with positive 
and negative returns: p-value                                         
R  squared  0.48 0.48 0.53 0.53    0.48 0.48 0.52 0.52    0.48  0.48  0.52  0.52 
Number  of  companies  13 13 13 13    13 13 13 13    13  13  13  13 
Number  of  newspapers  6 6 6 6    6 6 6 6    6  6  6  6 
Observations  37911 37911 37911 37911    37911 37911 37911 37911    37911  37911  37911  37911 
newspaper  fixed  effects  yes yes yes yes    yes yes yes yes    yes  yes  yes  yes 
company  fixed  effects  yes yes yes yes    yes yes yes yes    yes  yes  yes  yes 
newspaper x company fixed effects  no  no  yes  yes    no  no  yes  yes    no  no  yes  yes 
Notes: the table displays the output of regressions with the relative frequency of articles on newspaper n mentioning company c as dependent variable. Company and newspaper fixed effects are included in columns [1]-[2], [5]-[6] and [9]-[10]. In 
columns [3]-[4], [7]-[8] and [11]-[12] (company x newspaper) fixed effects are included as well. In columns [1]-[4] we add trading volume as a regressor, together with its interaction with past month's ads expenditure. In columns [5]-[8] we control for the 
contemporaneous level of ads, while in columns [9]-[12] we control for the sum of ads expenditure during the past three months. Standard errors are clustered at the (company x newspaper) level, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in 
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